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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
 The state appeals from the district court’s order granting Gunnar 
Breymann’s1 motion to suppress.  The district court erred when it suppressed 
statements made by Breymann and erred when it held that Breymann’s consent 
to search his bedroom was not voluntary.    
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 
On March 17, 2015, Breymann’s father called Deputy Herbig and reported 
that some property had been stolen from their house.  (Tr., p. 7, Ls. 16-24.2)  
During the investigation, Deputy Herbig found paraphernalia used for smoking 
methamphetamine on the back porch.  (Tr., p. 8, L. 9 – p. 9, L. 10.)  Breymann’s 
father told Deputy Herbig that Breymann had used drugs and had been to rehab 
several times.  (Tr., p. 9, Ls. 11-23.)  Breymann’s father was concerned that 
Breymann was using drugs again.  (Id.)  Breymann’s father asked Deputy Herbig 
to hold the burglary report because Breymann may be a suspect.  (Tr., p. 10, Ls. 
1-16.)  Breymann’s father asked Deputy Herbig to speak with Breymann’s 
mother.  (Tr., p. 10, L. 23 – p. 11, L. 7.)   
On March 22, 2015, as Deputy Herbig was headed back to the 
Breymanns’ house, Deputy Herbig saw Breymann walking a small white dog.  
                                            
1 The defendant’s name is spelled both “Breymann” and “Breyman” in the clerk’s 
record.  For the purposes of this appeal, the state will use the spelling reflected 
in the Clerk’s Certification and official caption of appeal.  (R., pp. 149-152.)   
2 All transcript references are to the July 7, 2015 Motion to Suppress hearing, 
unless otherwise indicated.   
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(Id.)  Shortly after Deputy Herbig made contact with Breymann, the small white 
dog got off its leash and took off running.  (Tr., p. 11, L. 12 – p. 12, L. 5.)  
Breymann ran after the dog, and Deputy Herbig drove around the block and 
caught the dog.3  (Id.)   
Deputy Herbig and Breymann then engaged in a conversation regarding 
the burglary and then life in general.  (See Ex. 1 at 0:00 – 7:00.4)  After 
Breymann discussed the stress in his life he admitted that, since he’d been off 
probation, he had not used drugs, except for a “little weed here and there.”  (Ex. 
1 at 6:30 – 7:15.)  Deputy Herbig asked Breymann if he were to take a urine test 
what would Breymann “piss hot for” and Breymann said “green” and nothing 
else.  (Ex. 1 at 7:30 – 7: 40.)  Breymann denied owning the methamphetamine 
paraphernalia that Deputy Herbig found on the back porch.  (Ex. 1 at 10:29 – 
10:40.)   
Breymann admitted that he had some “weed paraphernalia” in his 
bedroom and a “bong or two” and offered to get it for Deputy Herbig.  (Ex. 1 at 
11:10 – 11:49.)  Deputy Herbig explained that he “didn’t give a rip about a little 
weed” but since Deputy Herbig now knew it was there, he needed to “handle it” 
and could not just leave it there.  (Ex. 1 at 12:24 – 13:00.)  Breymann then called 
his mother, and Breymann and Deputy Herbig both spoke with Breymann’s 
                                            
3 It is at this point that Deputy Herbig’s body camera began recording.  (Tr., p. 
11, Ls. 20-25; R., p. 121.)   
4 At the hearing on Breymann’s motion to suppress the parties stipulated to the 
admission of Deputy Herbig’s body camera video, which was divided into 
Exhibits, 1, 2 and 3.  (Tr., p. 5, L. 9 – p. 6, L. 5.)  All exhibit video times 
referenced in this brief are approximate.   
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mother.  (Ex. 1 at 13:02 – 16:43.)   
Deputy Herbig drove to Breymann’s house, and Breymann walked with 
the white dog back to his house.  (See Ex. 1 at 22:00 – 24:00.)  At the house, 
Deputy Herbig spoke with Breymann’s mother and waited outside until he was 
allowed inside the house.  (Ex. 1 at 23:30 – 25:22.)  Once inside the living room, 
Deputy Herbig explained to Breymann’s mother that Breymann had admitted to 
having marijuana paraphernalia in his room, and Deputy Herbig had found drug 
paraphernalia on the back porch in his earlier visit to the house.  (Ex. 1 at 25:30 
– 26:20.)  Deputy Herbig explained that he had enough evidence to obtain a 
search warrant to search Breymann’s bedroom, and he would rather not go to 
the extent of getting a search warrant, but it was entirely up to Breymann if he 
had to go through with it.  (Id.)  Deputy Herbig again explained that getting the 
drugs out of Breymann’s bedroom would be the only way Breymann could get 
clean.  (Ex. 1 at 26:30 – 26:40.)   
At that point Breymann admitted that he was “planning on relapsing 
tonight” because he “wanted to kill everybody” and when he “gets high” all his 
problems go away.  (Ex. 1 at 26:35 – 27:20.)  Breymann admitted that he was 
going to use “meth” but he did not have it yet.  (Id.)  Deputy Herbig stated that he 
had seen enough people who use methamphetamine to understand those 
people who use it have a “rough” time.  (Ex. 1 at 27:30 – 27:50.)   
Deputy Herbig asked Breymann what “we” can do to help, and Breymann 
eventually stated that he was going to deny Deputy Herbig’s request to search 
his bedroom and he wanted Deputy Herbig to go through with getting a search 
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warrant.  (Ex. 1 at 27:50 – 29:15.)  During the conversation, Breymann was 
walking around his living room and kitchen, getting milk from the fridge and 
smoking a cigarette.  (Ex. 1 at 25:20 – 29:15.)  Breymann’s mother was also in 
the living room during the conversation.  (Id.)  Deputy Herbig detained Breymann 
in handcuffs while he got the search warrant.  (Ex. 1 at 27:50 – 29:15.)   
While Deputy Herbig was putting the handcuffs on Breymann, Breymann 
started asking Deputy Herbig more questions.  (Ex. 1 at 29:15 – 30:00.)   
Breymann: [inaudible] I mean either way I’m going to jail, right?   
Deputy Herbig:  I don’t know, what’s in your room, man?   
Breymann: If I tell you now, you can [inaudible] stuff?   
Deputy Herbig: What’s in there?  That depends on what’s in there. 
Breymann’s mother: [inaudible] 
Breymann: What’s in there? I have a really, really old pipe I found.. 
Deputy Herbig: Ok.  Meth pipe?  
Breymann: Yeah.  And a bong my friend gave me.   
(Ex. 1 at 29:15 – 30:00.)   
Deputy Herbig then asked Breymann whether he wanted his mom to stay 
in the room.  (Ex. 1 at 30:18 – 30:30.)  Breymann’s mother stayed in the room.  
(Id.)  Breymann was upset about the possibility of going to jail, so Deputy Herbig 
helped Breymann sit down.  (Ex. 1 at 30:40 – 30:45.5)   
                                            
5 Deputy Herbig’s body camera footage is divided up into the three video 
exhibits.  At this point in the recording, Exhibit 1 ends and the footage continues 
on Exhibit 2.   
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Breymann complained that the handcuffs were too tight and Deputy 
Herbig immediately loosened the handcuffs.  (Ex. 2 at 0:45 – 1:18.)  Deputy 
Herbig again explained that he found paraphernalia at the house on his last visit, 
and Breymann admitted to having paraphernalia in his room and Breymann 
denied consent to search the room, so Deputy Herbig was going to detain 
Breymann until he could get the search warrant.  (Ex. 2 at 0:00 – 1:58.)   
Breymann then asked Deputy Herbig, “What if I allow you to search?  
Either way I’m going to jail, yeah?”  (Ex. 2 at 1:58 – 2:06.)  Deputy Herbig 
responded that he did not know what was going to happen because he did not 
know what was in Breymann’s room.  (Id.)  Deputy Herbig then tried to clarify 
what was in Breymann’s room, but Breymann interrupted him and complained 
that Deputy Herbig did not understand Breymann’s problems and then Breymann 
blamed his father.  (Ex. 2 at 2:05 – 2:34.)   
Then, without prompting, Breymann told Deputy Herbig, “If you want to go 
search my room, go for it.  You can go search my room right now.”  (Ex. 2 at 2:33 
– 2:40.)  At this point, Deputy Herbig was radioing for a second unit.  (Ex. 2 at 
2:43 – 2:50.)  Breymann then turned and asked his mother to call his father 
because Breymann was upset at his father.  (Ex. 2 at 2:58 – 3:09.)  Deputy 
Herbig started to talk to Breymann again, but Breymann cut him off and loudly 
told Deputy Herbig, “I grant you access to search my room!”  (Ex. 2 at 3:12 – 
3:17.)   
Deputy Herbig, who had radioed in for a second unit, told Breymann “it’s 
too late for that” and clarified that Breymann is not under arrest but was just 
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detained.  (Ex. 2 at 3:17 – 3:30.)  Deputy Herbig tried to clarify whether it was 
just paraphernalia in Breymann’s bedroom, and Breymann explained there was 
“meth paraphernalia, weed paraphernalia, some empty weed bags on the 
ground.”  (Ex. 2 at 3:28 – 3:50.)  Breymann explained there was no actual “dope” 
in the room except for some “stale,” “old, old resin at the end of the stem, if you 
know what that is.”  (Ex. 2 at 3:50 – 4:06.)   
Breymann, Deputy Herbig and Breymann’s mother then talked about 
Breymann’s buddy, Tim Shanks, who had used drugs and been arrested.  (Ex. 2 
at 4:20 – 5:40.)  Breymann believed that even having a clean “meth pipe” was 
enough for a felony in Idaho.  (Ex. 2 at 5:40 – 5:52.)  Deputy Herbig explained 
that it was not enough for a felony in Idaho.  (Id.)  Breymann’s mother asked 
Deputy Herbig if he was waiting for a second unit, and Deputy Herbig answered 
in the affirmative.  (Ex. 2 at 6:07 – 6:17.)   
Deputy Herbig asked Breymann if he had been using marijuana up until 
now, and Breymann cracked a joke about being fat.  (Ex. 2 at 6:38 – 6:42.)  
Breymann’s mother asked Deputy Herbig about Breymann possibly going to drug 
court.  (Ex. 2 at 6:40 – 7:05.)  Breymann started talking about potentially enlisting 
in the military. (Ex. 2 at 7:05 – 7:22.)   
Deputy Herbig asked Breymann where the weed was coming from and 
Breymann said, “I can’t tell you that.”  (Ex. 2 at 7:38 – 7:45.)  Deputy Herbig 
responded, “Ok.  I can respect that.”  (Id.)  Deputy Herbig got a phone call from 
his backup unit, and after giving his backup unit driving directions, Deputy Herbig 
apologized to Breymann for the interruption.  (Ex. 2 at 7:55 – 8:58.)  Breymann’s 
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mother and Breymann told Deputy Herbig that Breymann had problems with 
people in the drug culture.  (Ex. 2 at 8:57 – 10:10.)  Breymann and his mother 
complained that there were some “really bad” and “very bad” police officers in 
the area, but they appreciated the “good ones.”  (Ex. 2 at 10:02 – 10:52.)   
Breymann started describing some of the drug paraphernalia in his room 
and when he got the paraphernalia.  (Ex. 2 at 10:52 – 11:22.)  Deputy Herbig 
requested Breymann slip on his shoes so they could walk out to Deputy Herbig’s 
car, because backup had arrived.  (Ex. 2 at 11:22 – 12:28.)  After he was in 
Deputy Herbig’s car, Breymann asked if was being put in the car only because 
Deputy Herbig was searching his room, to which Deputy Herbig replied “nope.” 
(Ex. 2 at 12:35 – 12:42.6)   
Deputy Herbig removed the handcuffs and started to read Breymann his 
rights, but Breymann interrupted Deputy Herbig to ask a question about reporting 
child molestation.  (Ex. 3 at 0:00 – 1:15.)  After answering Breymann’s question, 
Deputy Herbig advised Breymann of his Miranda rights.  (Ex. 3 at 1:14 – 1:40.)  
Breymann stated he understood his rights.  (Id.)   
Deputy Herbig again explained that, because he found drug paraphernalia 
on the back porch and Breymann told him there was paraphernalia in his 
bedroom, Deputy Herbig could not just leave.  (Ex. 3 at 1:42 – 2:20.)  Deputy 
Herbig said he could call a judge and prosecutor or Breymann could fill out the 
consent to search form.  (Id.)  Breymann requested that he be allowed to hug his 
                                            
6 At this point in the recording Exhibit 2 ends and Exhibit 3 begins.   
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mom if he had to go to jail.   (Ex. 3 at 2:20 – 2:27.)  Deputy Herbig responded 
that “[h]e did not see why not.”  (Id.)   
Deputy Herbig asked what he was going to find in Breymann’s bedroom 
and Breymann again described the paraphernalia and residue, but Breymann 
claimed he had not purchased his “dope” for the night yet.  (Ex. 3 at 2:40 – 3:20.)  
Breymann filled out the consent to search form and calmly asked Deputy Herbig 
several questions about the form, which Deputy Herbig answered.  (Ex. 3 at 3:48 
– 6:40; Ex. 4.)  Breymann asked to come back in the house and Breymann was 
allowed to come back into the house while Deputy Herbig searched Breymann’s 
bedroom.  (Ex. 3 at 6:45 – 30:35.)  
While Deputy Herbig was searching Breymann’s room, Breymann’s 
mother volunteered to tell Deputy Herbig if she came across anything that he 
missed during his search.  (Ex. 3 at 26:03 – 26:20.)   
In Breymann’s room, Deputy Herbig found five small bags containing 
methamphetamine, and methamphetamine paraphernalia containing 
methamphetamine residue.  (R., pp. 16-17; Tr., p. 13, L. 19 – p. 14, L. 5.)  The 
state charged Breymann with Possession of a Controlled Substance, 
Methamphetamine.  (R., pp. 53-54.)  Deputy Herbig also found three small bags 
with flakes of marijuana, a pharmacy bottle containing flakes of marijuana, 
aluminum foil with marijuana residue, marijuana seeds and a “small red bong.”  
(R., p. 17.)  Breymann was not charged for possession of marijuana or marijuana 
paraphernalia.  (See R., pp. 53-54; Tr., p. 27, Ls. 4-21.)   
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Breymann filed a Motion to Suppress the statements made by Breymann 
and to suppress the observations made by the officers during the search of his 
house and the evidence seized.  (R., pp. 65-67, 88-104.)  The state responded.  
(R., pp. 109-119.)  At the hearing on Breymann’s motion to suppress the parties 
stipulated to the admission of Deputy Herbig’s body camera video, which was 
divided into three exhibits.  (Tr., p. 5, L. 9 – p. 6, L. 5; Exs. 1, 2, and 3.)   
Relying almost exclusively on the contents of Deputy Herbig’s body 
camera, the district court granted Breymann’s motion to suppress.  (R., pp. 120-
131.)  First, the district court ruled that Breymann was not seized when Deputy 
Herbig spoke with Breymann on the street.  (R., pp. 125-126.)  
Because Herbig did not have his overhead lights on, and he did not 
by means of physical force or show of authority restrain 
[Breymann’s] liberty, this Court cannot conclude that a seizure of 
[Breymann] occurred on the street. 
 
(Id.)   
Next, the district court held that Breymann was placed “in custody” when 
Deputy Herbig detained Breymann in handcuffs.  (R., p. 127.)  The district court 
held that, because Deputy Herbig did not read Breymann the Miranda warnings 
when Deputy Herbig initially placed the handcuffs on Breymann, any pre-
Miranda statements were inadmissible.  (R., pp. 126-127.)   
At the moment when Herbig handcuffed [Breymann] in the 
Breymann home, [Breymann] was in custody, but no Miranda rights 
were given. Herbig continued to interrogate [Breymann] until 
backup arrived about twelve minutes later. Therefore, the Court 




(R., p. 127.)  After Deputy Herbig’s backup arrived, Deputy Herbig escorted 
Breymann out to his car, where Deputy Herbig read Breymann his Miranda 
rights.  (Ex. 3 at 1:00 – 1:40.)  However, the district court held that Breymann’s 
post-Miranda statements were also inadmissible because the Miranda warnings 
“did not effectively advise him ‘that he had a real choice about giving an 
admissible statement at that juncture.’”  (R., p. 128 (citing Missouri v. Seibert, 
542 U.S. 600, 612 (2004)). 
Considering the intensity of the questioning [Breymann] underwent 
for nearly an hour preceding the giving of Miranda warnings, and 
his fragile demeanor at the point the warnings, were given, the 
Court finds that the warnings, when given to [Breymann] in the 
patrol vehicle, did not effectively advise him “that he had a real 
choice about giving an admissible statement at that juncture.”  
Therefore, in this case, “there is no practical justification for 
accepting the formal warnings as compliance with Miranda, or for 
treating the second stage of interrogation as distinct from the first, 
unwarned and inadmissible segment.”  Accordingly any post-
Miranda statements made by [Breymann] in the patrol vehicle are 
also inadmissible. 
 
(R., p. 128 (citing Seibert, 542 U.S. at 612).) 
 The district court then concluded Breymann’s “will [was] overborne by 
police conduct.”  (R., p. 129.7)  The district court determined that any statement 
Breymann made after he was placed in custody was coerced because Breymann 
told Deputy Herbig “that he was suffering from stress and anxiety, and 
[Breymann] was crying and distraught.”  (R., pp. 129-130.)   
                                            
7 The district court’s memorandum decision does not explain the difference 
between the pre- and post-Miranda “statements” that it found inadmissible (R., 
pp. 127-128) and the involuntary “confession” that it also found inadmissible.  
(R., pp. 128-130).  It is not clear what the district court considers a “statement” 
and what was a “confession.”   
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In this case, the absence of Miranda warnings, the youth of 
the accused, and the repeated and prolonged nature of the 
questioning, make up the totality of circumstances that show that 
[Breymann’s] will [was] overborne by police conduct.  Also relevant 
is [Breymann’s] mental condition.  At various times during their 
conversation, [Breymann] told Herbig that he was suffering from 
stress and anxiety, and he was crying and distraught.  These are 
facts indicating heightened susceptibility to police coercion. 
 
Prior to being placed into custody, [Breymann] only made 
admissions about possession of marijuana and marijuana 
paraphernalia.  He denied possessing any methamphetamine. 
After being placed into custody, he made admissions regarding 
methamphetamine and/or methamphetamine paraphernalia.  The 
Court finds that any confession made after he was placed into 
custody was coerced, and is thus, inadmissible. 
 
(R., p. 130.)   
 
The district court also held that Breymann’s consent to search was 
coerced by Deputy Herbig.  (Id.)   
Considering the circumstances of this case, as discussed 
above, the Court finds that [Breymann’s] consent to search was the 
result of duress and coercion, and is therefore, inadmissible. 
 
(Id.)   
 
Finally, the district court held that the evidence seized from Breymann’s 
bedroom was the “fruit of the poisonous tree” pursuant to the “illegally obtained 
consent” and was inadmissible.  (R., p. 131.)  The state timely appealed.  (R., pp. 




 Did the district court err when it:  
 
1. Failed to consider all the circumstances when it held Breymann was in 
custody and suppressed all of Breymann’s pre-Miranda statements? 
 
2. Suppressed Breymann’s “confession” even though the evidence did not 
support a finding of a police coercion and the district court failed to 
articulate how Deputy Herbig coerced the confession?   
 
3. Determined that Breymann’s consent to search was the result of police 
duress and coercion even though there is no evidence to support this 





The District Court Erred When It Granted Breymann’s Motion To Suppress  
 
A. Introduction 
 Without analyzing “all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation,” 
the district court found that Breymann was “in custody” for the purposes of 
Miranda when Deputy Herbig detained Breymann while Deputy Herbig obtained 
a search warrant.  (See R., pp.126-128.)  The district court erred.  
 The district court also erred when it held that Breymann’s confession was 
“involuntary.”  (R., pp. 128-130.)  Coercive police activity is a necessary 
predicate to the finding that a confession is not voluntary.  The district court 
made a conclusory statement regarding coercion but did not articulate how or 
what Deputy Herbig did that was coercive, nor does the evidence support a 
finding that Deputy Herbig engaged in coercive police activity.  The district court 
erred.   
The district court also erred when it held that Breymann’s consent to 
search was “the result of duress and coercion.”  (R., p. 130.)  The district court 
relied upon Deputy Herbig’s body camera footage.  (R., pp. 122-124; Exs. 1, 2 
and 3.)  However, the body camera footage shows that Deputy Herbig did not 
coerce Breymann into granting consent.  (See Ex. 1 at 29:15 – 31:03; Ex. 2 at 
0:00 – 3:17.)  After Breymann requested Deputy Herbig get a search warrant, 
Deputy Herbig detained Breymann.  (See id.)  However, before backup arrived, 
Breymann, without prompting from Deputy Herbig, changed his mind and 
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granted consent.  (See id.)  There was no duress or coercion.  The district court 
erred.   
B. Standard Of Review 
 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated.  When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the 
trial court’s findings of fact which are supported by substantial evidence, but 
freely reviews the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found.  
State v. Ballou, 145 Idaho 840, 186 P.3d 696 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing State v. 
Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996).   
 
C. The District Court Erred When It Failed To Consider “All of the 
Circumstances Surrounding The Interrogation” When It Determined That 
Breymann Was “In Custody” For The Purposes Of Miranda 
 
The district court failed to consider all of the circumstances surrounding 
the “interrogation” when it determined that Breymann was in custody and 
suppressed Breymann’s pre-Miranda statements.  (See R., pp. 126-127.)  “The 
requirement for Miranda warnings is triggered by custodial interrogation.”  State 
v. Beck, 157 Idaho 402, 407, 336 P.3d 809, 814 (Ct. App. 2014) (citing State v. 
Medrano, 123 Idaho 114, 117, 844 P.2d 1364, 1367 (Ct. App. 1992)).  “The 
United States Supreme Court equated custody with a person being deprived of 
his or her freedom by the authorities in any significant way.”  Id. at 408, 336 P.3d 
at 815 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966)). “This test has 
evolved to define custody as a situation where a person’s freedom of action is 
curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest.”  Id. (citing Berkemer v. 
McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984); State v. Myers, 118 Idaho 608, 610, 798 
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P.2d 453, 455 (Ct. App. 1990)).  “The initial determination of custody depends on 
the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views 
harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned.”  Id. 
(citing Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323 (1994)).  To determine whether 
a suspect is in custody, “the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable person in 
the suspect’s position would have understood his or her situation.”  Id.  (citing 
Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 442 (1984); Myers, 118 Idaho at 611, 798 P.2d at 456). 
“A court must consider all of the circumstances surrounding the 
interrogation.”  Id. (citing Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 322; State v. James, 148 Idaho 
574, 577, 225 P.3d 1169, 1172 (2010)).  The Idaho Court of Appeals laid out 
possible factors to be considered:  
Factors to be considered may include the degree of restraint on the 
person’s freedom of movement (including whether the person is 
placed in handcuffs), whether the subject is informed that the 
detention is more than temporary, the location and visibility of the 
interrogation, whether other individuals were present, the number 
of questions asked, the duration of the interrogation or detention, 
the time of the interrogation, the number of officers present, the 
number of officers involved in the interrogation, the conduct of the 
officers, and the nature and manner of the questioning. 
 
Id. (citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. at 441-442; James, 148 Idaho at 577-
578, 225 P.3d at 1172-1173).  “The burden of showing custody rests on the 
defendant seeking to exclude evidence based on a failure to administer Miranda 
warnings.” Id. (citing James, 148 Idaho at 577, 225 P.3d at 1172).   
Here the district court did not consider all of the circumstances.  It only 
considered that Breymann was detained in handcuffs for “about twelve minutes.”  
(R., p. 127.)  The district court failed to consider that Deputy Herbig repeatedly 
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told Breymann that he was just being detained while he got a search warrant, 
and that he did know if Breymann was going to jail.8  (See Ex. 1 at 29:15 – 
30:00; Ex. 2 at 0:00 – 2:06, 3:17 – 3:30.)  For the purposes of the Miranda “in 
custody” test, “a person detained during execution of a search warrant is 
generally not in custody.”  State v. Young, 136 Idaho 711, 719, 39 P.3d 651, 659 
(Ct. App. 2002) (citing United States v. Burns, 37 F.3d 276 (7th Cir. 1994); 
United States v. Ritchie, 35 F.3d 1477 (10th Cir.1994); State v. Dawson, 295 
Mont. 212, 983 P.2d 916 (1999)).  Here, Deputy Herbig had probable cause to 
obtain a search warrant to search Breymann’s room because Breymann, prior to 
be being detained, admitted to having marijuana paraphernalia in his room and 
Deputy Herbig had found drug paraphernalia at the house.  See, e.g., State v. 
Hansen, 151 Idaho 342, 256 P.3d 750 (2011) (drugs found in a common area of 
house can provide probable cause to obtain a search warrant to search the rest 
of the house); State v. Rozajewski, 159 Idaho 261, __, 359 P.3d 1058, 1062 (Ct. 
App. 2015).  Although Breymann was detained while Deputy Herbig was in the 
process of obtaining a search warrant, he was not in custody to a degree 
associated with formal arrest.   
The district court also did not consider the “location and visibility” of the 
interrogation.  The “interrogation” took place in Breymann’s own brightly lit living 
room.  The interview in Breymann’s home setting weighs against any 
                                            
8 It was not until Breymann was finally placed in the patrol car that Deputy Herbig 
indicated that Breymann was not just detained.  (Ex. 2 at 12:35 – 12:42.)  This 
was after Breymann had admitted that there might be some methamphetamine 
residue in a pipe.  (Ex. 2 at 3:50 – 4:06.)   
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claim of coercion as it is not the sort of “police-dominated atmosphere” that led 
the Supreme Court to require Miranda warnings.  Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 
292, 296 (1990) (“The warning mandated by Miranda was meant to preserve the 
privilege during incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated 
atmosphere.  That atmosphere is said to generate inherently compelling 
pressures which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist and to compel 
him to speak where he would not otherwise freely do so.”) (citations and 
quotations omitted).   
The district court did not consider that another person was present.  
Breymann’s mother was present the entire time and participated in the interview.  
The district court did not consider that the interrogation took place during the 
day.  Further, the district court did not consider that only one officer was present 
with Breymann and his mother.   
Nor did the district court consider the “conduct of the officers, and the 
nature and manner of the questioning.”  See Beck, 157 Idaho at 408, 336 P.3d 
at 815.  Deputy Herbig’s conduct was calm and respectful.  Deputy Herbig’s 
questions were not badgering or aggressive.  Deputy Herbig, Breymann, and 
Breymann’s mother engaged in a fairly broad discussion that was not just 
focused on the drugs in Breymann’s bedroom.  For example, at one point while 
Breymann was in handcuffs, he and his mother felt comfortable enough to 
complain about the “really bad” and “very bad” police officers in the area.  (Ex. 2 
at 10:02 – 10:52.)   
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Instead of considering all of the “circumstances surrounding the 
interrogation” the district court instead focused solely on the fact that Breymann 
was placed in handcuffs without immediate Miranda warnings and ended the 
analysis.  (R., p. 127.)  The district court erred.   
 
D. The District Court Erred When It Found Breymann’s Confession Was 
Involuntary, Because There Was No Police Coercion  
 
Aside from the question of whether Breymann should have been 
Mirandized, the district court also determined that Breymann’s confession was 
not made voluntarily.  (R., pp. 128-130.)  “The use against a criminal defendant 
of a statement that the defendant made involuntarily violates the Due Process 
Clause.”  State v. Hays, __ Idaho ___, 362 P.3d 551, 560-61 (Ct. App. 2015) 
(citing Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109–10 (1985); Haynes v. Washington, 
373 U.S. 503, 514–15 (1963); State v. Doe, 131 Idaho 709, 712, 963 P.2d 392, 
395 (Ct. App. 1998)). “The exclusionary rule ‘applies to any confession that was 
the product of police coercion, either physical or psychological, or that was 
otherwise obtained by methods offensive to due process.’”  Id. (citing State v. 
Doe, 130 Idaho 811, 814, 948 P.2d 166, 169 (Ct. App. 1997)). “In determining 
whether a statement was involuntary, the inquiry is whether the defendant’s will 
was overborne by police coercion.”  Id. (citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 
279, 286 (1991); Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 177 (1986); Doe, 131 
Idaho at 713, 963 P.2d at 396; State v. Davila, 127 Idaho 888, 892, 908 P.2d 
581, 585 (Ct. App. 1995)). 
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“[C]oercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a 
confession is not ‘voluntary’ within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.” Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167.  “Indeed, coercive 
government misconduct was the catalyst for this Court’s seminal confession 
case, Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 56 S.Ct. 461, 80 L.Ed. 682 (1936).” 
Connelly, 479 U.S. at 163. “In [Brown], police officers extracted confessions from 
the accused through brutal torture.”  Id.  “[T]he cases considered by th[e] Court” 
post-Brown “have focused upon the crucial element of police overreaching.”  Id. 
at 163-164.  “While each confession case has turned on its own set of factors 
justifying the conclusion that police conduct was oppressive, all have contained a 
substantial element of coercive police conduct.”  Id. at 164.  “Absent police 
conduct causally related to the confession, there is simply no basis for 
concluding that any state actor has deprived a criminal defendant of due process 
of law.”  Id.   
 The Idaho Court of Appeals’ holding in Hays, supra, is instructive 
because, in Hays, the district court made the same error as the district court did 
in this case: 
Without further explanation, the district court held that “the totality 
of the circumstances, including [Deputy] Osborn not giving Miranda 
warnings prior to questioning Hays, the repeated questioning, 
length of the detention, Hays’ apparent hypersensitivity, and 
[Deputy] Osborn’s direct or implied promises” all demonstrate that 
Hays’ confession was involuntary and not a product of her free will. 
However, under the facts of this case, there is nothing that 
rendered Hays’ confession involuntary as the product of police 
coercion. Deputy Osborn’s interaction with Hays did not exceed the 
scope of interaction with a driver in a normal traffic stop situation 
when a drug dog is lawfully utilized. Hays’ apparent 
hypersensitivity, which Deputy Osborn could not have known, does 
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not bear on whether the officer’s conduct was coercive. Deputy 
Osborn’s suggestion to Hays that if she had marijuana, producing it 
could be “handled easily” by a resulting citation or warning was not 
an improper promise. Hays was, in fact, cited for the marijuana. 
 
Hays, __ Idaho at __, 362 P.3d at 560-61.  Here, the district court, made almost 
the exact same findings, also without explanation, as the district court did in 
Hays.  There is nothing under the facts of this case that rendered Breymann’s 
confession involuntary as the product of police coercion.  As the uncontested 
evidence shows, Deputy Herbig was respectful and patient during his entire 
interaction with Breymann and Breymann’s mother.  Deputy Herbig told 
Breymann that he did not “give a rip” about the marijuana – and Breymann, 
unlike Hays (who was cited), was not cited or charged for the marijuana 
possession.   
Simply put, Deputy Herbig did not coerce Breymann into confessing, and 
without the necessary predicate finding of police coercion Breymann’s 
confession was not “involuntary.”  The district court erred.   
 
E. The District Court Erred When It Found That Deputy Herbig Coerced 
Breymann Into Granting Him Consent To Search Breymann’s Room 
 
Deputy Herbig detained Breymann until he could get a warrant to search 
Breymann’s bedroom.  (Ex. 1 at 29:15 – 31:03; Ex. 2 at 0:00 – 1:58.)  After 
Deputy Herbig loosened Breymann’s handcuffs, Deputy Herbig explained that he 
was going to detain Breymann until he could get the search warrant.  (Ex. 2 at 
0:00 – 1:58.)   
Breymann then asked Deputy Herbig, “What if I allow you to search?  
Either way I’m going to jail, yeah?”  (Ex. 2 at 1:58 – 2:06.)  Deputy Herbig 
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responded that he did not know what was going to happen because he did not 
know what was in Breymann’s bedroom.  (Id.)  Deputy Herbig then tried to get 
Breymann to clarify what was in his bedroom, but Breymann interrupted him and 
complained that Deputy Herbig did not understand Breymann’s problems.  (Ex. 2 
at 2:05 – 2:34.)   
Then, without prompting, Breymann told Deputy Herbig, “If you want to go 
search my room, go for it.  You can go search my room right now.”  (Ex. 2 at 2:33 
– 2:40.)  Deputy Herbig then started to talk to Breymann again, but Breymann 
cut him off and loudly told Deputy Herbig, “I grant you access to search my 
room!”  (Ex. 2 at 3:12 – 3:17.)  Breymann later filled out the consent to search 
form.  (Ex. 3 at 3:48 – 6:40.)   
The district court erred when it found that Breymann’s consent to search 
his room was “coerced.”  (R., p. 130.)  The district court stated, “Considering the 
circumstances of this case, as discussed above, the Court finds that 
[Breymann’s] consent to search was the result of duress and coercion and is 
therefore inadmissible.”  (R., p. 130.)  The district court is incorrect.   
“Although a warrantless entry or search of a residence is generally illegal 
and violative of the Fourth Amendment, such an entry or search may be 
rendered reasonable by an individual’s consent.”  Ballou, 145 Idaho at 846, 186 
P.3d at 702 (citing State v. Johnson, 110 Idaho 516, 522, 716 P.2d 1288, 1294 
(1986); State v. Abeyta, 131 Idaho 704, 707, 963 P.2d 387, 390 (Ct. App. 1998)).  
“In such instances, the state has the burden of demonstrating consent by a 
preponderance of the evidence.”  Id. (citing State v. Kilby, 130 Idaho 747, 749, 
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947 P.2d 420, 422 (Ct. App. 1997)). “The state must show that consent was not 
the result of duress or coercion, either direct or implied.”  Id. (citing Schneckloth 
v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248, (1973); State v. Whiteley, 124 Idaho 261, 
264, 858 P.2d 800, 803 (Ct. App. 1993)).  “The voluntariness of an individual’s 
consent is evaluated in light of all the circumstances.”  Whiteley, 124 Idaho at 
264, 858 P.2d at 803.  “Whether consent was granted voluntarily, or was a 
product of coercion, is a question of fact to be determined by all the surrounding 
circumstances.”  Id. (citing State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 796, 69 P.3d 1052, 
1057 (2003). “In a suppression hearing where voluntariness is an issue, the 
power to assess the credibility of the witnesses, resolve any conflicts in the 
testimony, weigh the evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial 
court.”9 Id. (citing Abeyta, 131 Idaho at 708, 963 P.2d at 391).   
The Idaho Court of Appeals laid out a variety of factors to be considered 
when making a determination of voluntariness: 
Factors to be considered include whether there were numerous 
officers involved in the confrontation, the location and conditions of 
the consent, including whether it was at night, whether the police 
retained the individual’s identification, whether the individual was 
free to leave, and whether the individual knew of his right to refuse 
consent. Although the presence of multiple officers does not, 
standing alone, establish coercion, and there is no requirement that 
police inform the individual he is free to leave or that he has a right 
to refuse consent, these factors are nevertheless relevant when 
assessing the totality of the circumstances.  
 
State v. Garcia, 143 Idaho 774, 778, 152 P.3d 645, 649 (Ct. App. 2006) (internal 
                                            
9 The district court’s decision regarding the voluntariness of Breymann’s consent 
relied exclusively on the video exhibits, Exhibits 1, 2 and 3.  (See R., pp. 128-
131.)  
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citations omitted).  The district court erred because it did not consider any of 
these factors when examining the voluntariness of Breymann’s consent.  (See 
R., pp. 120-131.)  These factors show Breymann’s consent was voluntary.  
There were not numerous officers present.  Only Deputy Herbig was present.  
Deputy Herbig was outnumbered by Breymann and his mother.  Breymann gave 
consent while sitting in his own living room during the day.  There is no evidence 
that Deputy Herbig ever asked for, much less retained, Breymann’s identification.  
While Breymann was not free to leave at the time he gave consent, Breymann 
was legally detained while Deputy Herbig  obtained a search warrant.  See State 
v. Kapelle, 158 Idaho 121, 129, 344 P.3d 901, 909 (Ct. App. 2014) (officers can 
detain a suspect to preserve the status quo while they obtain a search warrant).  
Breymann knew he had the right to refuse consent, as evidence by the facts that 
he initially denied consent and that Deputy Herbig explained to Breymann that he 
could deny consent, but in that event, Deputy Herbig would get a search warrant.     
“A consent is not rendered invalid merely because an officer has said that 
a warrant will be sought if consent is refused.”  State v. Tietsort, 145 Idaho 112, 
118, 175 P.3d 801, 807 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing State v. Smith, 144 Idaho 482, 
163 P.3d 1194 (2007); State v. Fee, 135 Idaho 857, 863, 26 P.3d 40, 46 (Ct. 
App. 2001); State v. Kilby, 130 Idaho 747, 947 P.2d 420 (Ct. App. 1997)).  “Many 
jurisdictions have concluded that, if officers have probable cause to obtain a 
warrant, telling a suspect that they will obtain a warrant if consent is refused 
does not vitiate the suspect’s consent to search.”  Ballou, 145 Idaho at 848, 186 
P.3d at 704 (citations omitted). The Idaho Supreme Court explained:    
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“Under the Fourth Amendment, a person is assured ‘not that no 
government search of his house will occur unless he consents; but 
that no such search will occur that is unreasonable.’” The question 
is not whether [the defendant] wanted to have his home searched, 
but whether he voluntarily consented to it. [The defendant] would 
have preferred that no search take place, but as a practical matter 
that choice was not before him. He was deprived of that choice, not 
by police misconduct, but by the existence of probable cause to 
search his apartment. His options were to allow a warrantless 
search or insist on a warrant. While [the defendant] did not like the 
choices, that does not mean he was coerced.  
 
Smith, 144 Idaho at 488, 163 P.3d at 1200 (citations omitted).  The same is true 
here.  Breymann’s options were to consent to a warrantless search or insist on 
the warrant; while he did not like the choices, it does not mean he was coerced.  
After Breymann initially denied consent, Breymann then changed his mind and 
spontaneously granted Deputy Herbig permission to search his room.  (Ex. 2 at 
2:33 – 3:17.)  The video shows no coercive behavior by Deputy Herbig.  Deputy 
Herbig was respectful and considerate of Breymann and his mother.  The district 




 The state respectfully requests that the district court’s Memorandum 
Decision and Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Suppress be reversed and 
this case remanded for further proceedings.   
 DATED this 22nd day of February, 2016. 
       
 _/s/ Ted S. Tollefson____ 
 TED S. TOLLEFSON 
 Deputy Attorney General
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